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VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Employer Liability for Supervisor Sexual Harassment
In its 1997-1998 term, the United States Supreme Court ren-
dered three landmark sexual harassment decisions in the employ-
ment area. These cases establish new standards of employer liabil-
ity for supervisor sexual harassment in Title VII' claims. In two
closely related decisions, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton2 and Burling-
ton Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,3 the Court held that an employer is vi-
cariously liable under Tide VII for a supervisor's actionable dis-
crimination of a lower-level employee, regardless of the employer's
knowledge of the harassment.4 Where no tangible employment ac-
tion is taken, the employer may assert an affirmative defense that
looks to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct and the rea-
sonableness of the employee's actions to prevent and avoid harm.5
These decisions mark the Court's only discussion of the standards
of employer liability since it held, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson,6 that employer liability is determined by traditional agency
principles.
In Faragher, Beth Ann Faragher ("Faragher") worked as an
ocean lifeguard with the marine safety division of the City of Boca
Raton ("City") from 1985 until she resigned in 1990.8 In 1992,
Faragher brought a civil action against the City and her immediate
supervisors, Bill Terry ("Terry") and David Silverman ("Silver-
man"), alleging that a sexually hostile atmosphere existed at the
beach.9 Faragher alleged that Terry and Silverman subjected her
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1994)
("Tide VII").
2. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
3. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
4. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. The
Court handed down both decisions on June 26, 1998. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at
2275; Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2257.
5. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
6. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
7. See id. at 73.
8. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2280.
9. See id.
1109
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and other female lifeguards to repeated, "uninvited and offensive
touching," lewd remarks and gestures, and offensive talk about
women. Faragher specifically alleged that Terry told her he would
never promote a woman to the rank of lieutenant and Silverman
once said to her, "[d] ate me or clean the toilets for a year."' Based
on these and other allegations, Faragher asserted that Terry and
Silverman were agents of the City whose conduct resulted in dis-
crimination in the "terms, conditions, and privileges" of her em-
ployment in violation of Title VII.12
After a bench trial, the district court concluded that the super-
visors' conduct was discriminatory harassment sufficiently serious to
alter Faragher's conditions of employment and to create an abusive
working environment.1 The trial court found three bases for im-
puting liability to the city. First, the severity of the conduct sup-
ported an inference that the City knew or should have known
about it. 4 Second, Terry and Silverman committed the harassing
conduct while they were acting as agents for the city. 5 Finally,
Faragher told another supervisor, Robert Gordon ("Gordon"),
about the harassment and he did not act upon the information. 6
Therefore, the district court awarded judgment in favor of
Faragher. 7
A panel of the court of appeals for the Eleventh Circuit re-
versed thejudgment against the City."' While the panel found that
the supervisors' conduct created an "abusive work environment," it
held that the City was not liable because Terry and Silverman were
not acting within the scope of their employment when they en-
gaged in harassing conduct, and their agency relationship with the
City did not facilitate the harassment. 9 It further held that neither
the pervasiveness of the harassment nor Gordon's knowledge of it
could constitute constructive knowledge by the City.0
The court of appeals, sitting en banc, concurred with the
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Seealso42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
13. SeeFaragher, 118 S. Ct. at2281.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. The court awarded Faragher only one dollar in nominal damages.
See id.
18. SeeFaragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155, 1166 (11th Cir. 1996).
19. See id.
20. See id.
1110 [Vol. 25
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panel and rejected Faragher's Title VII claim against the City."
The court determined that: (1) the supervisors' sexual harassment
was a "frolic" outside the scope of their employment and for their
own personal ends; (2) the City did not aid them in perpetrating
the harassment because something more than an agency relation-
ship and improper conduct is required for such a finding; and (3)
the City could not be charged with constructive knowledge of the
harassment because it was not pervasive enough and it occurred at
a remote location.22
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the dif-
fering approaches used by the courts of appeals to create standards
governing employer liability for hostile environment harassment.23
The Court enunciated a new standard for determining employer
liability,24 reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, and re-
manded for judgment in favor of Faragher.25 The Court held that
an employer is liable to an employee for "an actionable hostile en-
vironment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively
higher) authority over the employee.' 2' The Court further held
that an employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or
27damages if no tangible employment action is taken. The two-
pronged defense requires an employer to show, subject to proof by
a preponderance of the evidence: "(a) that the employer exercised
21. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1539 (11th Cir. 1997)
(en banc) (7-5 decision).
22. See id. at 1537-38. The full court of appeals, relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), and on
the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958), held:
[A]n employer may be indirectly liable for hostile environment sexual
harassment by a superior: (1) if the harassment occurs within the scope
of the superior's employment; (2) if the employer assigns performance of
a nondelegable duty to a supervisor and an employee is injured because
of the supervisor's failure to carry out that duty; or (3) if there is an
agency relationship which aids the supervisor's ability or opportunity to
harass his subordinate.
Id. at 1535.
23. SeeFaragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (1998).
24. See id. at 2292-93.
25. See id. at 2282.
26. Id. at 2293.
27. See id. Tangible employment action means a "significant change in em-
ployment status" and includes discharge, demotion, and reassignment or signifi-
cant change in benefits. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268
(1998).
1999] 1111
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reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually har-
assing behavior, and (b) that the employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities pro-
vided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." 8 If an em-
ployer takes tangible employment action (such as demotion or re-
duction in pay), no affirmative defense is available.2 In so holding,
the Court sought to reconcile the need to impose vicarious liability
for abuse of supervisory authority resulting in harm with Tide VII's
basic policy of encouraging employers to be proactive in creating
and using antiharassment policies and grievance procedures.0
The Court first sought to address the appellate court's reliance
on a scope of employment analysis. The Court recognized that
there are two conflicting lines of cases on vicarious employer liabil-
ity.31 The first line of cases suggests that sexual harassment falls be-
yond the scope of the employment relationship. 3 Courts reaching
this conclusion have emphasized that "harassment consisting of
unwelcome remarks and touching is motivated solely by individual" 33
desires and serves no purpose of the employer. These cases have
compared sexual harassment to "frolic and detour" cases that do
not impose vicarious liability on the employer. The appellate
court in Faragher adopted this view.35 The second line of cases holds
that the scope of employment is defined broadly enough to include
intentional torts that serve no purpose of benefiting the employer.
36
28. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 2292. The rationale is that where a supervisor uses his or her
authority to discriminate against an employee and to create a tangible job detri-
ment, such acts are company acts that are attributable to the employer. See id. On
the other hand, attributing employer liability in every instance gives employers no
incentive to create and enforce antiharassment policies. See id. at 2292-93. The
Court's holding sought to reconcile these principles by imposing vicarious liability
where there is tangible employment detriment, and allowing the employer an af-
firmative defense where there is not. See id.
31. See id. at 2286.
32. See id. See, e.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potach, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1444 (10th
Cir. 1997) cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 2364 (1998) (noting that sexual harassment is
not within the job description of employees at any reputable business); Andrade v.
Mayfair Management, Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating explicitly that
sexual harassment is not within the scope of a supervisor's employment).
33. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2286-87.
34. See id. at 2287.
35. See id. at 2286.
36. See id. at 2287. See, e.g., Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398
F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) (ruling that the government had vicarious liability for
damages to drydock and ship caused by a drunken sailor, even though the sailor's
1112 [Vol. 25
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss3/12
EMPLOYMENT LA W
The rationales for these decisions vary but include the notion that
certain employee acts are foreseeable and that employers must bear
the cost of doing business, as well as the idea that employee mis-
conduct can arise from or be related to the employee's essential
duties.3 7
The Court rejected the use of a scope of employment versus
frolic analysis for two reasons. First, drawing a line between scope
and frolic can result in differing outcomes for equally impermissi-
ble behavior.3 The Court used the example of a supervisor who
racially discriminates to avoid problems with prejudiced employ-
ees-presumably an act intended to further the interests of his em-
ployer by placating the workforce. 39 In contrast, the supervisor in
the instant case was motivated by his own sexual interests and not
by an interest of serving the employer.40 The former supervisor
would be acting within the scope of his employment while the latter
would not.4' Second, the lower courts uniformly have held that
employer liability for co-worker harassment is judged by a negli-
gence standard, thereby implicitly treating co-worker harassment as
outside the scope of employment.42 The Court opined that if scope
of employment could create employer liability for actions of the
"supervisor" class of employees, it would be just as appropriate for
the same standard to apply to the "co-worker" class of employees.3
Instead, the Court adopted the aided-by-agency relation prin-
ciple set forth in section 219(2) (d) of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, which provides that an employer:
is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment unless... the ser-
vant purported to act or speak on behalf of the principal
and there was reliance on apparent authority, or he was
conduct was not motivated to serve his employer, because the sailor's conduct was
not so unforeseeable as to make it unjust to hold the government responsible);
Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 128 N.E. 711, 711 (N.Y. 1920) (holding em-
ployer liable under workers' compensation statute for an eye injury caused by an
employee who threw an apple at another person because the accident arose in the
course of employment).
37. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2287.
38. See id. at 2288-89.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 2289.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
1999] - 1113
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aided in accomklishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation.
The Court concluded that "it makes sense to hold an employer
vicariously liable for some tortious conduct of a supervisor made
possible by abuse of his supervisory authority, and.., the aided-by-
agency-relation principle... provides an appropriate starting point
for determining liability for the kind of harassment presented
here."45 The Court reasoned that supervisors use their position of
authority when discriminating and employees are not as able or
willing to combat harassment by a supervisor as they are that of a
46co-worker. Additionally, employers should have an incentive to
carefully select, train, and monitor its supervisors.47 Though there
are good reasons for imposing vicarious liability for supervisors who
misuse their authority, the Court had to square this rationale with
its holding in Meritor that "an employer is not 'automatically' liable
for harassment by a supervisor who creates the requisite degree of.... ,,48
discrimination .... Therefore, the Court adopted an affirmative
defense to liability in circumstances where no tangible employment
action is taken, even where the supervisor has created an actionable
environment.49
In the second case, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,5 the
Court's holding was the same as in Faragher, but the issue was dif-
ferent. The issue in Burlington, as framed by the Court, was
"whether... an employee who refuses the unwelcome and threat-
ening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no adverse, tangi-
ble job consequences, can recover against the employer without
showing the employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for the su-
pervisor's actions.
5
Kimberly Ellerth ("Ellerth") brought suit against her former
employer under Tite VII alleging that sexual harassment by a su-
44. Id. at 2290 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (d)
(1958)).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 2291.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 2292. See also supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
50. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
51. Id. at 2262.
52. Id.
1114 [Vol. 25
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pervisor forced her constructive discharge. 3 Ellerth alleged that
she quit her sales job of fifteen months after being subjected to re-
peated sexual harassment by her supervisor, Ted Slowik
54("Slowik"). Slowik was not Ellerth's immediate supervisor, but was
a mid-level manager and the vice president of one of five business
units within one of Burlington's divisions.' Ellerth worked in a
small Chicago office and answered to her colleague, who in turn
answered to Slowik in New York.56
Ellerth's allegations included three episodes with Slowik that
could be construed to have denied Ellerth tangible job benefits.
First, on a 1993 business trip, Slowik made comments about El-
lerth's breasts, told her to "'loosen up"' and warned,"' .. . I could
make your life very hard or very easy at Burlington.' 58 Next, in
March of 1994, when interviewing Ellerth for a promotion, Slowik
rubbed her knee and expressed reservations about her because she
was not "'loose enough."' 9 When Slowik later called to award El-
lerth the promotion he said, "'you're gonna be out there with men
who work in factories, and they certainly like women with pretty
butts/legs. "' Finally, Ellerth called Slowik to ask permission to use
61a customer's logo on a fabric sample. Slowik told her, "'I don't
have time for you right now, Kim-unless you want to tell me what
you're wearing."'62 Ellerth abruptly ended the conversation, but
was forced to call within the next day or two to have her request
63approved. During this conversation, Slowik denied her request
and added something to the effect of, "'are you wearing shorter
skirts yet, Kim, because it would make your job a whole heck of a
lot easier. -64
Ellerth quit her job shortly thereafter and faxed Burlington a
letter explaining the reasons for her resignation but not mention-
65ing the sexual harassment. However, three weeks later, she sent a
53. See id. at 2263.
54. See id. at 2262.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief at 156).
59. Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief at 159).
60. Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief at 159-60).
61. See id.
62. Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief at 78).
63. See id.
64. Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief at 79).
65. See id.
11151999]
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letter explaining that Slowik's sexually harassing conduct forced
her resignation. While Ellerth knew that Burlington had a policy
against sexual harassment she chose not to report Slowik while she
67was a Burlington employee.
The trial court granted Burlington summary judgment on El-
lerth's claim that Burlington engaged in sexual harassment, forcing
Ellerth's constructive discharge in violation of Title VII.68 While the
trial court found that Ellerth's allegations, if true, would amount to
the creation of a hostile work environment by Slowik, it concluded
that Burlington neither knew nor should have known about the
conduct.69 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
reversed the trial court's decision, issuing eight separate opinions
and not agreeing on a controlling rationale. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to define the relevant standards of employer li-
ability when a supervisor creates a hostile working environment by
making explicit threats to alter a lower-level employee's terms or
conditions of employment, but does not fulfill the threat.7 ' The
Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's reversal of summaryjudgment
71for Burlington and remanded, adopting its holding in Faragher.
The carrying out of threats is known as "quid pro quo" har-
assment, whereas offensive gestures, remarks and sexual attentions
66. See id.
67. See id. at 2262-63.
68. See id. at 2263; see also Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101,
1124 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
69. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2263. The district court identified the quid
pro quo element of the hostile environment claim and applied a negligence stan-
dard. See id. Ellerth's Title VII and constructive discharge claims were dismissed.
See id.
70. See id. The judges agreed that the issue they faced was vicarious liability,
not failure to comply with a duty of care. See id. They further agreed that if
Slowik's unfulfilled threats to deny Ellerth tangible job benefits were enough to
impose vicarious liability on Burlington, Ellerth could recover on her claim. See id.
Most of the judges were in accord that Ellerth's claim could constitute a quid pro
quo claim even though Ellerth received a promotion and was subjected to no tan-
gible retaliation. See id. However, disagreement arose over the standard for im-
posing employer liability for such a claim. See id. Sixjudges agreed upon a vicari-
ous liability standard that would allow Ellerth to recover even though Burlington
was not negligent. See id. Two judges would have imposed vicarious liability based
upon agency principles. See id. Anotherjudge would have followed state law, and
yet another applied a negligence standard. See id. at 2263-64.
71. See id. at 2264; see also supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing harassing conduct outside the scope of employment).
70. See Burlington, 118 S. CL at 2270-71; see also supra notes 24-29 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Faragher decision).
1116 [Vol. 25
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that are so pervasive as to create a hostile work environment are
known as "hostile work environment" harassment. 3 The Court dis-
agreed with the growing body of case law that suggested that em-
ployer liability turned largely on whether harassment was "hostile
work environment" or "quid pro quo," and that readily attached
employer liability to the latter. The Court ruled that while the dis-
tinctions are valid for purposes of establishing actionable conduct
under Title VII, the categories "quid pro quo" and "hostile work
environment" are not controlling on the issue of vicarious em-
ployer liability.75 While Ellerth framed her cause of action as one of
"quid pro quo" harassment, the Supreme Court held that
"[b]ecause Ellerth's claim involves only unfulfilled threats, it
should be categorized as a hostile environment claim ... . 76 This
designation, however, has no impact on the determination of vi-
carious liability. The Court focused the new inquiry on whether
the employee has suffered a tangible employment detriment.7
Where there has been no tangible employment detriment, the in-
quiry focuses on the reasonableness of the employer in acting to
prevent and correct harassment and the reasonableness of the em-
ployee in using available complaint mechanisms and avoiding fur-
ther harm.
78
The Court's decisions in Faragher and Burlington send a clear
message to employers and employees alike to act reasonably and
responsibly when responding to sexual harassment and discrimina-
tion. While, as a matter of law, the absence of an antiharassment
policy and grievance procedure is not fatal, employers would be
wise to employ a suitable policy to support the first prong of their
defense: that the employer used reasonable care to prevent or
promptly correct sexual harassment. Likewise, an employee's
failure to avoid harm by utilizing an available grievance procedure
is normally sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the employer's
73. See Burlington, 118 S. Ct. at 2264.
74. See id. at 2264-65. Neither "quid pro quo" nor "hostile work environment"
appears in the text of Title VII. See id. at 2264. The Court concluded that because
Ellerth's claim involved unfulfilled threats, it is properly categorized as a hostile
environment claim that requires a showing of severe or pervasive conduct. See id.
at 2265.
75. See id. at 2265.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 2270.
78. See id.
79. See id.
1999] 1117
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defense: that the employee unreasonably failed to avoid harm or
use the preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the em-
ployer.
In the third case, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,81 the
Court held that same-sex sexual harassment in the workplace is ac-
tionable under Title VII.s ' The petitioner, Joseph Oncale ("On-
cale"), worked for Sundowner Offshore Services on an oil platform
in the Gulf of Mexico."' Oncale was a roustabout on an eight-man
crew that included John Lyons ("Lyons"), Danny Pippen ("Pip-
pen"), and BrandonJohnson ('Johnson").84 Lyons and Pippen had
85supervisory authority. Lyons, Pippen, andJohnson frequently sub-
jected Oncale to humiliating sex-related actions such as physical as-
86sault of a sexual nature and the threat of rape. Oncale reported
the harassment to the company's safety compliance clerk, Valent
87Hohen, but no remedial action was taken. Oncale quit and asked
that his pink slip state that he "voluntarily left due to sexual har-
assment and verbal abuse. "88 In deposition testimony Oncale
stated, "I felt that if I didn't leave my job, that I would be raped or
forced to have sex.,89
Oncale filed suit against Sundowner in the United States Dis-
trict Court for Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging discrimination
in employment because of his sex.90 Relying on Fifth Circuit
precedent, the district court held that because Oncale is a male, he
has "no cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male co-
workers."'91 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed.9' The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "nothing in
Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of...
sex' merely because the plaintiff and the defendant.., are of the
80. See id.
81. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
82. See id. at 1003.
83. See id. at 1000.
84. See id. at 1000-01.
85. See id. at 1001.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Id. The district court relied on the Fifth Circuit's holding in Garcia v. Elf
Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) in making its decision. See id.
92. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). In
affirming the lower court'sjudgment, a panel from the court of appeals concluded
that Garcia was binding circuit precedent. See id.
[Vol. 251118
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same sex." 93 Even though same-sex harassment was not the primary
evil that Congress sought to forbid in enacting Title VII, the Court
saw no justification in the statute language or its precedent to ex-
94clude same-sex harassment from its coverage.
The Court cautioned that its ruling does not expand Tide
VII into a civility code for the American workplace.95 Title VII does
not prohibit all harassment, but only "discriminat[ion] ... because
of... sex."96 In addition, Title VII forbids only harassment so of-
fensive as to alter the "terms, conditions, or privileges" of the vic-
tim's employment.97
In assessing the objective severity of the harassment, courts
should look to "the perspective of a reasonable person in the plain-
tiffs position, considering 'all the circumstances."' Particular at-
tention should be paid to the "social context" in which the behav-
ior occurs.99 The Court gave the example of the environment of a
professional football player. The coach slapping the player's but-
tocks as he runs onto the field may not be actionable, while the
same conduct experienced by the coach's secretary (male or fe-
male) in the office might be.' °° Looking to the social context
should enable fact finders to decipher actionable discrimination
from mere teasing or roughhousing.'0 '
B. Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment of an Employee by a Non-
Employee
Addressing a question of first impression, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals, in Costilla v. State,12 held that an employee may bring an
action under the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA") against
an employer for sexual harassment by a non-employee, if the em-
ployer is aware of the harassment yet fails to take timely and appro-
93. Id. at 1001-02. The Court did not rule on the merits of Oncale's claim,
but remanded for further proceedings consistent with its decision. See id. at 1003.
94. See id. at 1002.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 1002-03.
98. Id. at 1003 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. 571 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), review denied, (Minn.Jan. 28,
1998).
1999] 1119
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priate action.1°' This expansive interpretation of the MHRA is con-
sistent with the broad remedial purpose of the statute as well as
federal rules and decisions interpreting the scope of Title VII.1
4
Maria Costilla ("Costilla") worked with urban Hispanic farmers
and seasonal migrant farm workers as a state monitor advocate with
the Minnesota Department of Economic Security ("DES").1°5 Cos-
tilla was required to work closely with Herman Acosta ("Acosta"),
the federal regional monitor advocate employed by the U.S. De-
partment of Labor.106  Together, the two attended professional
training sessions and reviewed sites in rural locations where over-
night stays were requred.
Costilla alleged that between 1992 and 1995, Acosta engaged
in sexually harassing behavior including sexual advances, requests
for kisses, touching, and grabbing, as well as inappropriate com-
ments.' °s In June 1993, while working in Moorhead, Minnesota,
Acosta grabbed Costilla, attempted to kiss her, and wanted to get
into her hotel room.1° Costilla telephoned a co-worker in St. Paul,
Beverly Friendt ("Friendt"), to talk about the incident, and Friendt
reported it to supervisor Ronald Threatt, who took no action." °
During a November 1993 trip to Chicago, Acosta commented to
Costilla about her losing her virginity and publicly made inappro-
priate comments about the nature of their relationship.1 ' Costilla
again telephoned Friendt who reported the incident to the DES's
affirmative action officer, Linda Sloan ("Sloan") .Z2 Sloan reported
Acosta's behavior to his supervisor, promised Costilla she would not
have to be alone with Acosta, and helped arrange for Costilla to see
a counselor." 3
Despite Sloan's actions, Acosta's inappropriate behavior to-
103. See id. at 592.
104. See id. at 591 (stating that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion ("EEOC") guidelines and cases from other jurisdictions support the court's
broad interpretation of the MHRA).
105. See id. at 589.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. Acting upon Sloan's report, Acosta's supervisor spoke with and
wrote a memo to Acosta, prohibiting him from making sexually harassing com-
ments or otherwise acting in a sexually harassing manner. See id.
1120 [Vol. 25
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss3/12
EMPLOYMENT LAW
ward Costilla persisted.1 4 In February 1994, Costilla told Sloan that
Acosta was calling her at her home and making sexual remarks."'
Sloan again called Acosta's supervisor and was given assurances that
the problem would be resolved. 16 During an April 1994 training
session conducted by Acosta, he told an inappropriate sexual story
about Costilla and a male co-worker.1 7 Sloan called Acosta's super-
visor for the third time and it was agreed that Acosta would write a
letter of apology to all training participants."' Costilla never re-
ceived a letter and the harassing behavior continued until June
1995, when a DES commissioner sent a letter to the federal re-
gional administrator about Acosta's conduct.1 9
In January 1996, Costilla sued the state, claiming sexual har-
assment under the MHRA, breach of contract or promissory estop-
pel, and emotional distress damages. The district court granted
the state's motion for summary judgment on all claims, and Costilla
appealed as to her sexual harassment and emotional distress
claims.
12 1
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals faced the question
of whether the MHRA allowed a cause of action against an em-
ployer for failing to protect an employee from harassment by a
non-employee. 2g Giving an expansive reading to the MHRA, the
court held that the MHRA requires an employer to protect an em-
ployee from non-employee harassment under certain circum-
stances.1 23 In making its ruling, the court relied on the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") Guidelines,
decisions from other jurisdictions, and the broad remedial intent
124of the MHRA to eradicate discrimination from the workplace.First, the court observed that the U.S. Supreme Court has ap-
114. Seeid.
115. See id.
116. Seeid.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 589-90.
119. See id. at 590. Specifically, the letter insisted Acosta's conduct be fully in-
vestigated. See id. The U.S. Department of Labor subsequently assigned a new
federal monitor advocate to the Minnesota region. See id.
120. See id. In October of 1996, Costilla brought a separate claim against
Acosta and the U.S. Department of Labor. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 590-91.
123. See id. at 591.
124. See id. at 591-92.
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proved the use of EEOC guidelines in sexual harassment cases.15
The guidelines specifically recognize that an employer can be liable
for the sexual harassment of an employee by a non-employee. 6
Second, the court found that historically, Minnesota courts have
sought guidance from federal Title VII cases when construing the
MHRA. Several federal courts have held a cause of action to exist
against an employer for sexual harassment conducted by a non-
employee under Title VII. 128 Finally, the court concluded that to
effect the MHRA's broad remedial purpose, the MHRA should be
construed liberally.129 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
MHRA imposes a broad duty on employers to protect employees
from sexual harassment, including harassment by non-employees) 30
125. See id. In Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986), the
Supreme Court announced that courts and litigants may properly rely on the
EEOC guidelines for guidance.
126. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 591. The EEOC guidelines read:
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with
respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate cor-
rective action. In reviewing these cases, the Commission will consider the
extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility, which
the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-
employees.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1996).
127. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 591; see also Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 398-
99 (Minn. 1978) (stating that Title VII cases are instructive and may be used in in-
terpreting the MHRA).
128. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 591; Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc.,
107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an employer may be liable for har-
assment of employee by patrons where employer either ratifies or acquiesces in
harassment by not taking immediate or corrective action); Henson v. City of Dun-
dee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (lth Cir. 1982) (noting that non-employee strangers can
create a sexually hostile working environment); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F.
Supp. 599, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding employer liable to employee for sexual
harassment of employee by public where employer required an employee to wear
a sexually revealing costume).
129. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 592. See, e.g., Cummings v. Koehnen, 568
N.W.2d 418, 421-23 (Minn. 1997) (holding the MHRA should be liberally con-
strued to include same-sex sexual harassment); Continental Can Co. v. State, 297
N.W.2d 241, 248-49 (Minn. 1980) (holding that a liberal construction of the
MHRA makes co-employee sexual harassment actionable).
130. See Costilla, 571 N.W.2d at 592.
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C. Age Discrimination
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that an em-
ployee who takes early retirement due to an internal reorganization
may not sue for age discrimination under the federal Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). ' The U.S. Supreme
Court denied certiorari, leaving the appellate court's ruling undis-
turbed."2
In Johnson v. Runyon,"' a former postal employee brought an
age discrimination action against the U.S. Postal Service
("USPS")."' Charles Johnson ('Johnson") began working for the
USPS in 1960 when he was twenty years old.' In 1992, when John-
son was fifty-two years old, he held the position of USPS tour super-
intendent that involved supervising approximately 400 employ-136
ees. The USPS underwent a major reorganization that abolished
all tour superintendents and other management positions. 137 As
part of the reorganization, the USPS offered Johnson and other
qualifying employees early retirement packages. 38  Johnson had- 1 3 9
until November 20, 1992, to accept or decline the package.
On November 13, 1992, Johnson was told that he, like other
qualified employees, would be considered for the newly created
Manager of Distribution Operations ("MDO") positions.'4 The
MDO positions were higher-level positions that required skills in
addition to those required for the tour superintendent positions."'
On November 18, 1992, Michael Mautzek ("Mautzek"), the man-
ager responsible for promoting employees to the MDO positions,
candidly told Johnson that he would not be selected because he
lacked the requisite skills.1' 2 Mautzek testified that he also told
131. SeeJohnson v. Runyon, 137 F.3d 1081, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied
sub nom. Johnson v. Henderson, 119 S. Ct. 264 (1998).
132. See Henderson, 119 S. Ct. at 264.
133. 137 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Johnson v. Henderson,
119 S. CL 264 (1998).
134. Johnson, 137 F.3d at 1082.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. Preceding this reorganization, it was felt that upper management
was unsatisfied with the employees of the department in which Johnson worked on
account of their age. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
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Johnson that he would still have a position with USPS and would
not suffer any decrease in pay if he chose not to accept the early re-
tirement package. 143 Johnson testified that although he never in-
tended to retire early, he accepted the early retirement package.'
1
In December 1992, persons aged thirty-six to forty-eight were se-
lected for the MDO positions.
Johnson sued the USPS, alleging violations of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act. The district court concluded
that Johnson failed to present prima facie evidence of discrimina-
1 47tion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.'"
Prima facie evidence of age discrimination is demonstrated by
a showing that:
(1) plaintiff is within the protected age group, (2) plain-
tiff met applicable job qualifications and the legitimate
expectations of the employer, (3) despite these qualifica-
tions, plaintiff suffered a discharge or other adverse em-
ployment action, and (4) plaintiff was replaced by a
younger worker or in the reduction in force context, the
plaintiff must produce some additional evidence that age
was a motivating factor in the termination. 49
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that John-
son failed to show adverse employment action because he chose to
retire rather than await the outcome of the reorganization. 50
Absent adverse employment action, a plaintiff may recover
upon a showing of constructive discharge. 5' "[C]onstructive dis-
charge occurs when an employer renders the employee's working
conditions intolerable, forcing the employee to quit. The court
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 1083.
149. Id. at 1082 (citing Hopper v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 87 F.3d 983, 988 (8th
Cir. 1996) and Herrero v. St. Louis Univ. Hosp., 109 F.3d 481, 483-84 (8th Cir.
1997)).
150. See id. at 1082.
151. See id. at 1082-83.
152. Id. at 1083 (quoting Delph v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Paragould Inc.,
130 F.3d 349, 354 (8th Cir. 1997) and Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d
1124 [Vol. 25
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rejected Johnson's claim of constructive discharge, finding that
Johnson failed to demonstrate that a reasonable person in his situa-
tion would have found the working conditions intolerable.15 3 The
Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, conclud-
ing that Johnson failed to show an adverse employment action
within the meaning of the ADEA.
154
In light of Johnson, employees offered early retirement options
resulting from corporate cutbacks or reorganizations might think
twice about accepting such retirement packages if they believe the
employer's true motivation is age discrimination. Unless the em-
ployer had made working conditions "intolerable," awaiting the
outcome of such reorganizations is necessary to show the adverse
employment action required to make out a claim under the ADEA.
D. The Public Policy Requirement in Whistleblower Cases
Minnesota's whistleblower statute protects employees who
make reports of actual or suspected violations of federal or state law
by their employer. In Hedglin v. City of Willmar,116 the Minnesota
Supreme Court declined to decide whether the whistleblower stat-
ute requires that a violation implicate public policy to come under
its protection. The Hedglin court found that the employer's mis-
conduct, including falsification of attendance records and driving
fire trucks while intoxicated, implicated state law and therefore fell
within the plain language of the statute. 58
In Hedglin, three former firefighters, Joseph Hedglin ("Hedg-
lin"), Bradley Lundquist ("Lundquist"), and Robert Grove
("Grove"), filed a civil action against the City of Willmar ("Will-
mar") and its former fire chief, Douglas Lindblad ("Lindblad"),
under the whistleblower statute.159 The complaint alleged that
Lindblad and Willmar unlawfully retaliated against Hedglin, Lund-
quist and Grove, after they reported misconduct by the fire de-
partment to Willmar city officials. 6° The misconduct reported in-
568, 574 (8th Cir. 1997)).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See MiNN. STAT. § 181.932 (1998).
156. 582 N.W.2d 897 (Minn. 1998).
157. See id. at 901.
158. See id. at 902.
159. See id. at 898.
160. See id.
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cluded driving fire trucks and attending fire calls while intoxicated,
as well as the assistant chiefs falsification of roll call sheets showing
that he was present for calls he did not attend.
61
The Kandiyohi County District Court granted Willmar's mo-
tion for summary judgment, ruling that the statute did not protect
the reports because: (1) the harassment of Hedglin, Lundquist,
and Grove predated their reports of misconduct; and (2) falsifying
roll call sheets was a matter of internal management that did not
implicate the public policy requirement of the whistleblower stat-
ute.162 On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, con-
cluding that: (1) the falsification of roll call sheets constituted the
illegal taking of public funds, reports of which are protected by the
whistleblower statute; and (2) ajury could find that the harassment
of Hedglin, Lundquist, and Grove continued as a result of their re-. -- 163
ports of misconduct. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted re-
view to determine whether the reports of misconduct were pro-
tected under the whistleblower statute.164
The supreme court began its analysis by discussing the judi-
cially created public policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine. 165 The public policy exception has allowed an employee
to maintain a wrongful discharge claim against an employer if the
conduct reported "violated clearly mandated public policy."166 In
contrast, reports of internal policy violations having no impact on
the public interest would not be protected by this common law ex-
ception. 16 Before the enactment of the whistleblower statute, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals approved the public policy exception
in Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp.16 However, since the legisla-
ture enacted the whistleblower statute in 1987, Minnesota courts
have not resolved whether the statute should be interpreted to re-
quire that a reported violation implicate public policy.
161. See id. at 898-900.
162. See id. at 900.
163. See id. at 900-01. The court of appeals ruled that the falsification of roll
call sheets constituted an illegal taking of public funds because the falsification
resulted in payment to a firefighter for calls he did not attend. See id.
164. See id. at 901.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. See id. (discussing Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 592
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986)). Before the Minnesota Supreme Court issued an opinion
in Phipps, the legislature enacted the whistleblower statute. See id.
169. See id. at 901. The statute, which does not explicitly require a violation of
1126 [Vol. 25
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Lindblad and Willmar urged that at least two Minnesota deci-
sions have interpreted the whistleblower statute as requiring a vio-
lation of "clearly mandated public policy."' 70  The court rejected
their argument and declined to expand its interpretation of the
whistleblower statute to require a violation of public policy.
71
While the court noted that its decision in Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey
Medical Center, Inc.,7  contained dictum concerning "protection of
the general public,"173 it concluded that even applying the dictum
to the case at bar would not defeat the claim because Hedglin's re-
ports were made for the protection of the general public. 74
public policy, reads in pertinent part:
An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise dis-
criminate against, or penalize an employee regarding the employee's
compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment
because: (a) the employee ... in good faith, reports a violation or sus-
pected violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to
law to an employer or to any governmental body or law enforcement offi-
cial ....
MINN. STAT. § 181.932, subd. 1(a) (1998).
170. Hedglin, 582 N.W.2d at 902. Lindblad and Willmar relied on the appel-
late courts' decisions in Vonch v. Carlson Cos., 439 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989) and Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 483 (Minn.
1996). See id. The court rejected their argument for two reasons. See id. First, in
Vonch, the court of appeals found that reported internal travel and expense dis-
crepancies were only internal improprieties. See id. at 903. Therefore, the court
affirmed summary judgment for the employer. See id. In the court's conclusion it
made clear that the public policy exception was intended to protect the public and
not individual employees. See id. However, the whistleblower statute was not yet
enacted when the violations were reported or when the employee was discharged.
See id. Thus, the court in Hedglin stated that Vonch may not be used to analyze
claims brought specifically under the statute. Id. Second, while Williams ad-
dressed a claim brought under the whistleblower statute, the court merely held
that "a plaintiff who brings a claim under the Human Rights Act is barred from
also bringing a claim under the whistleblower statute." Id. (citing Williams, 551
N.W.2d at 483). Although it discussed protection of the public in dictum, the
court made no holding concerning a public policy requirement. See Hedglin, 582
N.W.2d. at 903. Therefore, this decision was also inapplicable to the Hedglin case.
See id.
171. See id.
172. 551 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. 1996).
173. Hedglin, 582 N.W.2d at 903 (citing Williams, 551 N.W.2d at 484 n.1).
174. See id. The footnote in Williams reads:
The popular title of the [whistleblower statute] connotes an action by a
neutral-one who is not personally and uniquely affronted by the em-
ployer's unlawful conduct but rather one who "blows the whistle" for the
protection of the general public or, at the least, some third person or
1999] 1127
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The facts in Hedglin did not require the court to reach the is-
sue of whether Minnesota's whistleblower statute contains a public
175 176policy requirement. Therefore, it declined to do so. While the
court acknowledged the public policy language used in Williams, it
emphasized that the language constituted no part of its holding
and gave no hint about how it would rule should the court be con-
177fronted with the public policy issue in the future. The question
of whether Minnesota's whistleblower statute requires a violation
that implicates public policy remains ripe for further litigation.
E. Tortious Interference With a Noncompete Agreement
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held that third party
interference with a noncompete agreement "is a tort for which
damages are recoverable."'78 The court's decision in Kallok v. Med-
tronic, Inc.179 made clear that an injured employer may recover its
attorney's fees and costs notwithstanding the general rule that at-
180torneys fees are not recoverable in tort litigation .
In 1979, Dr. Michael J. Kallok began his employment with
Medtronic as a senior staff engineer. As a Medtronic engineer,
Kallok engaged in the design and development of leads for defibril-
lator and electrocardiogram sensing.18' Medtronic required Kallok
to sign a standard noncompete agreement in 1979, and a revised
agreement in 1981.'8' As Kallok's career advanced, he became a
persons in addition to the whistleblower. Were it otherwise, every alleg-
edly wrongful termination of employment could, with a bit of ingenuity,
be cast as a claim pursuant to [the statute].
Williams, 551 N.W.2d at 484 n.1.
175. See Hedglin, 582 N.W.2d at 903.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 362 (Minn. 1998).
179. 573 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 1998).
180. See id. at 363-64 (stating that the third-party exception to the general rule
applied because a third party's tortious interference required litigation to enforce
a legitimate agreement).
181. See id. at 358. Kallok earned a Ph.D. in biomedical engineering from the
University of Minnesota. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. The revised 1981 agreement, stated in relevant part:
[F]or two (2) years after termination of employment he/she will not di-
rectly or indirectly render services (including services in research) to any
person or entity in connection with the design, development, manufac-
1128 [Vol. 25
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senior manager and was invited to take part in Medtronic's Man-
agement Incentive Plan. 84 As a participant, Kallok received in-
creased responsibilities, benefits and access to Medtronic's confi-S 185
dential information. In exchange for these benefits, Kallok was
required to sign noncompete ageements that placed additional re-
strictions on his employment.1
8
On November 21, 1995, Kallok resigned his employment with
Medtronic and informed the company that he was accepting a posi-
tion with Angeion Corporation, a direct competitor of Med-
tronic.18 7 Medtronic informed Kallok that if he began employment
with Angeion he would breach his covenant not to compete with
ture, marketing, or sale of a Competitive Product that is sold or intended
for use or sale in any geographic area in which Medtronic actively mar-
kets a Medtronic Product or intends to actively market a Medtronic
Product of the same general type or function. It is expressly understood
that the employee is free to work for a competitor of Medtronic provided
that such employment does not include any responsibilities for, or in
connection with, a Competitive Product as defined in this Agreement for
the two-year period of the restriction.
Id.
184. See id. at 359.
185. See id.
186. See id. Kallok signed the noncompete agreements, known as "Medtronic
Management Riders," in 1986, 1989, and 1993. See id. The last agreement that
Kallok signed stated in pertinent part:
For a period of one (1) year after termination of my employment with
Medtronic, I will not directly or indirectly render services for the benefit
of any person or organization (including myself) engaged in the design,
development, manufacture, marketing or sale of a product or service
which was being designed, developed, manufactured, marketed or sold
by Medtronic during the last year of my employment, or with respect to
which Medtronic has acquired confidential business information, unless:
(i) I did not have any involvement or responsibility in connection with
the competitive product or service while at Medtronic and did not have
access to confidential business information regarding the competitive
product or service; or (ii) such other person or organization is a diversi-
fied operation and my responsibilities do not include any activities in
connection with the design, development, manufacture, marketing, or
sale of a competitive product or service.
Id.
187. See id. at 357. Both Minnesota companies, Medtronic manufactures
medical devices including cardiovascular equipment, and Angeion manufactures
cardiac medical devices. See id. at 358. The companies are direct competitors in
the manufacture of implantable cardioconverter defribrillators and the manage-
ment of tachyrhythmia (rapid irregular heartbeats). See id. at 358.
11291999]
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Medtronic. 8  On December 4, 1995, Kallok began working for
189Angeion.
Angeion and Kallok brought a declaratory judgment action
against Medtronic to determine Kallok's rights under the noncom-
pete agreements. 190 Medtronic counterclaimed against Kallok for
breach of contract and injunctive relief, and against Angeion for
tortious interference with the employment contract.
19
1
The district court upheld the employment agreements and en-
joined Kallok from working for Angeion for one year.'92 Addition-
ally, the district court concluded that Angeion had tortiously inter-
fered with Kallok's employment contract and was therefore liable
to Medtronic for attorney fees and other incurred expenses. 193 On
appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of an
injunction, but reversed the trial court's finding that Angeion tor-
tiously interfered with Kallok's employment,9 4 as well as the award
of damages to Medtronic. 195 The appellate court reasoned that
Minnesota courts "have been loathe to recognize liability for the
tortious interference of a contract in the employment noncompete
188. See id. at 357.
189. See id. at 360. In 1995, Kallok arranged a meeting with Whitney McFarlin,
Angeion's CEO and a former Medtronic vice president. See id. at 359. During
their first meeting in May 1995, McFarlin told Kallok that Angeion had no suitable
openings. See id. The pair had other discussions culminating in a September 20,
1995, meeting at which McFarlin asked Kallok if he would be interested in a posi-
tion as Angeion's vice president of research. See id. The position involved tachy-
rhythmia research, among other projects. See id. Kallok expressed interest, but
continued his employment at Medtronic as he and McFarlin continued discus-
sions. See id. Sometime before October 18, 1995, Kallok told McFarlin of the em-
ployment agreements he had signed with Medtronic. See id. On October 18, 1995,
McFarlin sought the advice of outside counsel to determine whether Kallok would
be prohibited from working for Angeion. See id. Counsel told McFarlin that be-
cause they represented Medtronic in an unrelated matter, a conflict of interest ex-
isted preventing them from thoroughly researching the issue. See id. McFarlin
pressed counsel for an opinion and proceeded to tell counsel that within the past
two years, Kallok did not work in the tachyrhythmia area at Medtronic or have ac-
cess to confidential information. See id. Based only on this information, counsel
told McFarlin that Kallok's employment with Angeion would not be in violation of
his agreements with Medtronic. See id. After this discussion, McFarlin offered Kal-
lok the position. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 357-58.
193. See id. at 358.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 361.
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agreement realm.
''
1
96
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, upholding the tor-
tious interference claim against Angeion and the district court's
award of damages to Medtronic.'9 ' The supreme court reasoned
that established Minnesota law permits recovery for tortious inter-
ference with a valid noncompete agreement. 98  The court also
found it well established that a third party's tortious interference
with a contract may result in liability for damages as well as injunc-
tive relief' 99 Combining this reasoning, the court held that "if a
noncompete agreement is deemed valid and if the elements of tor-
tious interference are established, interference with the noncom-
pete agreement by a third party is a tort for which damages are re-
coverable. ,
200
Holding that a third party's tortious interference with a valid
employment agreement gives rise to a claim for damages, the Kallok
court next examined whether Medtronic stated a claim for tortious
interference with contract.2°' The court cited five elements that
must be established to state a cause of action for tortious interfer-
ence with contract: "(1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged
wrongdoer's knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional procure-
ment of its breach; (4) without justification; and (5) damages."
20 2
196. Id.
197. See id. at 358.
198. See id. at 361. The court cited Walker Employment Services, Inc. v. Parkhurst,
300 Minn. 264, 271, 219 N.W.2d 437, 441 (1974), and Bennett v. Ston Broadcasting
Co., 270 Minn. 525, 533, 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (1965), for the proposition that
noncompete agreements that serve a legitimate employer interest and are no
broader than necessary to protect that interest are enforceable. See id. To deter-
mine whether a noncompete agreement is enforceable, the court balances the in-
terest of the employer in protection from unfair competition with the right of the
employee to earn a living. See Walker, 300 Minn. at 271, 219 N.W.2d at 441; see also
Bennett, 270 Minn. at 535-36, 134 N.W.2d at 899-900 (stating that disputes arising
from restrictive clause provisions should not always be determined by examining
the contract; rather, each case must be determined on its own facts while main-
taining a reasonable balance between the interests of the employer and em-
ployee). Where the balance weighs in favor of the employer's interest, the non-
compete agreement is enforceable. See, e.g., Alside, Inc., v. Larson, 300 Minn. 285,
294-95, 220 N.W.2d 274, 279-80 (1974) (stating that the restraints must be rea-
sonably necessary to protect the employer's business and provide a legitimate
business purpose to be valid).
199. See Kallok, 573 N.W.2d at 361 (citing Nordling v. Northern States Power
Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 505 (Minn. 1991) and Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171
Minn. 260, 266, 214 N.W. 754, 756 (1927)).
200. Id. at 362.
201. Id.
202. Id. (quoting Kjesbo v. Ricks, 517 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. 1994)).
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The court affirmed the district court's finding that Medtronic es-
tablished all five elements of tortious interference. 3
First, Kallok entered a valid contract with Medtronic. 20 4 Sec-
ond, Angeion knew about the noncompete agreement before it
hired Kallok.20 5 Third, Angeion procured breach of the contract by
meeting with Kallok numerous times to discuss employment oppor-
tunities at Angeion and by offering Kallok a vice president position
206with the company.
The fourth element was established by proving that Angeion's
interference with the contractual relationship was not justified.207
Angeion argued that it acted in good faith by consulting with out-
side counsel before hiring Kallok and by taking the initiative to
seek judicial review.208 However, the court faulted Angeion for fail-
ing to provide its attorneys with complete information concerning
Kallok's position and responsibilities at Medtronic. 9 The court be-
lieved that had Angeion been completely candid with its attorneys,
it probably would have understood that hiring Kallok was in breach
of his agreements with Medtronic.210 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that Angeion's inquiry into Kallok's noncompete agree-
ments with Medtronic was not reasonable and, therefore, without
211justification.
The final element required to establish a claim of tortious in-
212terference is proof of damages. Angeion argued that the Ameri-
can rule prevents a party from recovering attorney fees and other
expenses incurred in litigation in the absence of a specific contract
or statutory authority.2 However, the court held that the district
203. See id. at 362-63.
204. See id. at 362.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 362-63.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 362. The defendant has the burden of proving justification. See
id. If a plaintiff proves that the "defendant had knowledge of facts which, if fol-
lowed by reasonable inquiry, would have led to a complete disclosure of the con-
tractual relations and rights of the parties," tortious interference is not justified.
Swaney v. Crawley, 154 Minn. 263, 265, 191 N.W. 583, 584 (1923). The court con-
cluded that Angeion did not completely inform its outside counsel about the na-
ture of Kallok's employment background or the noncompete agreements with
Medtronic. See Kallok, 573 N.W.2d at 362.
209. See Kallok, 573 N.W.2d at 362.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 362-63.
212. See id. at 363.
213. See id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
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court properly applied the third-party litigation exception to the
214
American rule. This exception permits the court to award attor-
neys' fees as damages if "the defendant's tortious act thrusts or pro-
jects the plaintiff into litigation with a third party."215 The court
concluded that but for Angeion's tortious interference with Med-
tronic's employment agreements with Kallok, Medtronic would not
have been forced into court to protect its rights.216 Therefore, the
third-party litigation exception to the American rule was properly
applied, allowing Medtronic to recover attorney's fees and other
217expenses incurred in defending its rights against Kallok.
After Kallok, it is clear that employers' efforts to recruit and
make employment offers to prospective employees who are subject
to noncompete agreements may result in liability for damages. Hir-
ing employers should exercise care in ascertaining the nature of
any such noncompete agreements and allow for thorough inquiry
before extending employment offers.
Kimberly Ross
271 (1975) (declining to award attorney's fees without statutory authorization)
and Barr/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto's, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46,53 (Minn. 1983)).
214. See id. at 363-64.
215. Id. at 363.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 363-64.
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